We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.
Introduction
The study of computational complexity in hedonic coalition formation games, or simply hedonic games, has a short history, although these issues in cooperative and non-cooperative game theory are being gradually recognized. Maybe the reason is that the formal model of a hedonic game was only recently introduced (cf. Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) ). This model consist of a …nite set of players and a preference relation for each player de…ned over the set of all coalitions containing the corresponding player. The outcome of a hedonic game is a coalition structure (i.e., a partition of the set of players into coalitions). A coalition structure is called stable if there is no group of individuals who can all be better o¤ by forming a new deviating coalition. The core of a hedonic game is the collection of all stable coalition structures.
Computational complexity issues related to hedonic games in a general setting are studied by Ballester (2004) . As shown by this author, the problem to decide whether a given hedonic game has a nonempty core is NP- In this note we consider the problem of core membership testing for hedonic games. Given a hedonic game and a coalition structure, the problem of core membership testing is to decide whether the coalition structure belongs to the core of the game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players'preferences are additive. Indeed, the co-NP completeness is shown by a reduction to hedonic games in which players'preferences are based on aversion to enemies. Hence, the preference domain based on aversion to enemies turns out to have a referential role with respect to this computational complexity issue.
Preliminaries
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a …nite set of players. A coalition is a nonempty subset of N . For each player i 2 N , we denote by player i 2 N , we denote by (i) the coalition in which contains i, i.e.,
We assume that each player i 2 N is endowed with a preference i over A i , i.e., a binary relation over A i which is re ‡exive, complete, and transitive. Moreover, we assume that the preference of each player i 2 N over C N is purely hedonic, i.e., it is completely characterized by i in such a way that, for each ; 0 2 C N , player i weakly prefers to 0 if and only if
A hedonic game is a pair hN; i of a …nite set N of players and a pro…le = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) of players' preferences. We denote by G the collection of all hedonic games. Let hN; i 2 G. We say that a coalition X is a deviation from a coalition structure in hN; i if X i (i) for each i 2 X. We say that a coalition structure is stable in hN; i if no deviation from exists, i.e., for each coalition X, there exists i 2 X satisfying (i) i X. The core of a hedonic game hN; i, denoted by (N; ), is the collection of all coalition structures which are stable in hN; i. 
For simplicity, by v i (X) we denote P j2X v i (j) for each i 2 N and for each X 2 A i .
Given an additive preference pro…le and any two players i; j 2 N , we say that j is a friend (enemy) of i if and only if
, and we say that j is a neutral coalitional partner of i. Finally, we say that a preference pro…le is based on aversion to enemies if is additive, and for each i 2 N , v i ( ) 2 f n; 1g with v i (i) = 1. Hence, restricting players' preferences in such a way displays a situation in which each player i 2 N has very strong enemies, very weak friends, and no neutral coalitional partners.
Core membership testing
In this section we study the problem of core membership testing formulated as follows:
The Problem of Core Membership Testing (cmt)
Given: A hedonic game hN; i 2 G and a coalition structure 2 C N .
Question: Is 2 (N; )?
This problem belongs to the complexity class co-NP, i.e., the complexity class containing the complements of the decision problems in the complexity class NP. The complement of a decision problem is de…ned as the problem with the "YES" and "NO" answer reversed. The complement of the cmt problem can then be described as follows. Given a hedonic game hN; i 2 G and a coalition structure 2 C N , and ask whether 6 2 (N; ), i.e., whether there is a deviation X from in hN; i. This problem, the complement of cmt, belongs to NP, because in polynomial time of n one can
(1) guess non-deterministically a coalition X, (2) test deterministically whether X is a deviation from in hN; i, and (3) the answer is "YES"if some coalition X is a deviation from in hN; i, and otherwise "NO".
Hence, the cmt problem belongs to co-NP.
Before we show that this problem is co-NP complete when players'preference are additive, let us …rst recall some properties of hedonic games with preference pro…les based on aversion to enemies. For more details the reader is referred to Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung (2004). Let hN; i 2 G be a hedonic game with preference pro…le based on aversion to enemies.
It is known that the core (N; ) is always nonempty.
In order to describe the properties of core members, let us introduce some terminology. Let H = (V; E) be a (undirected) graph, where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges, i.e., each edge is a set consisting of two di¤erent vertices from V . A clique X in H is a subset of V such that fi; jg 2 E for each i; j 2 X with i 6 = j.
Let H hN; i = (V; E) be a (undirected) graph with V = N , and
and let 2 C N be a core member, i.e., 2 (N; ). Then, it is known that each X 2 is a clique in H hN; i .
Suppose X is not a clique in H hN; i for some X 2 . Then, v i (j) = n for some i; j 2 X, which implies that v i (X) < v i (i). Hence, X i fig, and thus, fig is a deviation from in hN; i. Therefore 6 2 (N; ).
Moreover, it is known that at least one of the largest cliques in H hN; i belongs to .
Suppose does not contain any of the largest cliques in H hN; i , and let X be one of the largest cliques in H hN; i . Then, for each i 2 X, we have
Hence, X is a deviation from in hN; i, i.e., = 2 (N; ). It follows from this property that the problem of …nding a core member of a given hedonic game, with preference pro…le based on aversion to enemies, is at least as hard as the problem for …nding a largest clique in a given graph, which is a NP-hard optimization problem.
We are now ready to present our result.
Theorem 1
The problem of core membership testing for hedonic games with additive preference pro…le is co-NP complete.
Proof. As already mentioned, the cmt problem belongs to co-NP. It su¢ ces to show that this problem is co-NP hard. The co-NP hardness is shown by a polynomial time reduction from a co-NP complete problem called the clique problem, which is the complement of the clique problem. The clique problem is de…ned as follows:
Clique Problem (clique)
Given: A graph G = (V; E) and a positive integer 2 K jV j.
Question: Does G contain a clique of size K?
Let (G; K) be an instance of the clique problem, i.e., G = (V; E) is a graph and K is a positive integer such that 2 K jV j. De…ne a hedonic game hN; i as follows. Take N = f1; 2; : : : ; K 1g V to be the set of players, and let n = jN j = (K 1)jV j. For each (k; s) 2 N , the preference (k;s) of player (k; s) is characterized by the function v (k;s) , which is de…ned as follows: For each (`; t) 2 N ,
if k =`and fs; tg 2 E; n otherwise.
Observe that the transformation from (G; K) to the game hN; i can be done in O(jV j 4 ) time. Hence, it is a polynomial time reduction. Moreover, observe that players'preferences are, in fact, based on aversion to enemies.
Next, de…ne = fX s j s 2 V g with X s = f1; 2; : : : ; K 1g fsg for each
Obviously is a partition of N , i.e., is a coalition structure. Also notice that each X s is a clique of size K 1 in H hN; i , because v (k;s) (`; s) = 1 for all k;`2 f1; 2; : : : ; K 1g and for each s 2 V . In the following we show that 6 2 (N; ) if and only if G contains a clique of size K.
(1) Suppose that G contains a clique Y of size K. Then, for each k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; K 1g, fkg Y is also a clique of size K in H hN; i . Hence, each fkg Y is a deviation from , and therefore = 2 (N; ).
(2) Suppose = 2 (N; ). Then there exists a deviation Z from . Since each X s 2 is a clique of size K 1 in H hN; i , Z must also be a clique of size at least K in H hN; i in order to be a deviation from . Let Z 0 be a subset of Z of size K. Since Z is a clique in H hN; i , Z 0 is also a clique in H hN; i .
Then, by de…nition, we have either
We show that k = k 0 and s
Then, there exists (k 0 ; s 0 ) 2 Z 0 such that s 0 6 = s, because jZ 0 j = K > K 1 = jX s j, and thus, we have k 0 = k. We are done when K = 2. When K 3,
there exists (k 00 ; s 00 ) 2 Z 0 such that (k 00 ; s 00 ) 6 = (k; s) and (k 00 ; s 00 ) 6 = (k 0 ; s 0 ).
When s 00 = s, we have k 00 6 = k, and thus, we have k 00 6 = k = k 0 and s 00 = s 6 = s 0 , so that there is no edge between (k 0 ; s 0 ) and (k 00 ; s 00 ) in H hN; i , and Z 0 cannot be a clique in H hN; i . The same argument hold when s 00 = s 0 . Hence, k = k 0 and s 6 = s 0 for all (k; s); (k 0 ; s 0 ) 2 Z 0 with (k; s) 6 = (k 0 ; s 0 ). i.e., Z 0 fkg V for some k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; K 1g.
Finally, since Z 0 is a clique of size K in H hN; i and Z 0 fkg V for some k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; K 1g, we have fs; tg 2 E for each (k; s); (k; t) 2 Z 0 .
Therefore, fs 2 V j (k; s) 2 Z 0 g is a clique of size K in G.
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